The Rescue of POWs attempted - 1981

Those who insist no POWs were left behind cannot answer this question: Who was in the POW Prison Compound in Laos in 1981 that President Reagan authorized a rescue mission for? The "other sites" won't touch this with a 10 foot pole. (By now, you realize that "other sites" is short for the "official story" and not the hundreds of sites devoted to our missing men). One persistent whiner from one of the "other sites" claims they were Laotian prisoners. This is a stance given to me this year by a low level official at DPMO this year. In a while, you'll see why this whiner who claims to explode "myths" of the "MIA Cult" is possibly one of the biggest myth makers on the subject. There are two words for his and the DPMO position - BULL PUCKEY! Let's look at facts and not CYA excuses for failure to bring this national festering problem to a successful resolution.

History of POW rescue information

A fair question at this time is what do you know about a rescue mission since you were not a government employee at this time? I came across the story in March, 1981. As a long-time conservative activist, I was invited to brief, in Washington, D.C., the staffs of then Senator Roger Jepsen (R-IA) and then Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY) on the current POW situation. By that time, my reputation as a POW "expert" had grown since that moniker was first placed on me by former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) Roger Shields. I was also an attendee of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC 1981). As outlined in the book more extensively, I came across the POW rescue plan through a series of meetings and conversations with participants that reached into the Presidential inner circle. I was told that the plan for the rescue was then "on the President's desk."

What is relevant now is the proof that lead to the decision of the President of the United States to authorize a rescue attempt in 1981, eight years after the government now insists all POWs were accounted for and none existed at this time. This area of Laos, where the POW prison was located, had a long history of holding American POWs. Here are just a few of the reports that convinced our decision makers, as opposed to the low level minions who participate in CYA activities, that POWs were captive:

In 1972 - the CIA confirmed that US POWs were being held in an unnamed cave near Kham Keut

1974 - USAF Intelligence finds a Laotian source reporting American POWs near Kham Keut

1976 - A Laotian former USAID employee saw US POWs. He passed a polygraph. DIA later used this report to justify the rescue attempt

1978 - LTC Albert Shinkle, former USAF Attache, intel officer, told Congressional sources of a POW location near an unnamed cave near Kham Keut. The time frame of the US POWs reported is nearly the same as the confirmed CIA POW sighting above.

1979 - Lao guerilla source wrote to Vang Pao of US POWs being moved into the Nhom Marrot area from Kham Keut.

July 1979 - Photography of the area showed that the cave site described generally fit the detention area reported. A cave entrance is only 500 yards from the reported detention area. Heavy foilage at the reported area offers the possibility that another cave entrance is obscured from photography.

1979 - DIA receives several reports of American named POWs (Paul Mercland and Peter Pike) as being held in this area. One source passes a polygraph test. Multiple sources are reported. When shot down over Laos in 1969, the last known location of Pike and Bannon was about 55 miles away from Kham Keut.

1979 - MG Harold Aaron, Deputy DIA Director, authorizes LTC Bo Gritz to attempt verification of American POWs in Laos - or deny their existence. Aaron confirms that LTG Eugene Tighe, DIA Director, is aware of the activity, but his hands are tied. Carter Administration is accused of not facing up to the POW problem.

December 1979 - MG Aaron is "overwhelmed" by the evidence of Gritz and said "there can be no doubt" about the live POWs in Laos.

1979 - LTG Tighe testifies that POW reports should be classified to protect America POWs left behind. He also testified that he believed American POWs had been left behind in 1973, but there was not yet proof of their being alive. Much of his executive session testimony was classified, so it is unclear exactly when he told Congressional sources in 1979 about the new information that was coming in like a flood.

1980 - Laotian Guerilla leader is polygraphed and passes on his live American POW information

1980 - President Jimmy Carter is becoming convinced American POWs are alive and held captive.

December 1979 - DIA and NSA decide on closer coordination on POW matter - NSA reports that DIA believes "US POWs are in fact still alive in SEA"

November 1980 - A "sensitive source" reportedly known only to high US intelligence officials, reported movement of 30 American POWs to Nhom Marroth to work on a road gang. Satellite photography of 10 December 1980 shows 25 POWs at the detention facility - which was built at the same time of reported US movement of POWs into the area. A "52" is stamped in the dirt and not readily seen from the guard towers. Next to the 52 is a "K" or a "B" - both of which are highly significant meanings to rescue personnel. Continuous observance by satellites show the 52 in the same location and POWs were "continuously observed." By 24 January, 1981, the POWs were still reported, although a smaller number were seen.

December 30, 1980 - NSA, CIA, DIA meet. RADM Jerry Tuttle, DIA, believes there is "a strong suspicion US POWs remain in Laos" after a review of joint agency documentation. Also on the same day, CIA reports from Thailand that signal reports show American POWs are being flown into the Nhom Marrot area from Attopeu area. NSA confirms that a plane left Attopeu as reported.

December 1980 - RADM Jerry Paulson, DIA, reports that incoming National Security team for President Reagan - James Buckley, Richard Allen, and Alexander Haig, were advised on the probability of POWs alive in Laos. Allen was convinced of the American POW presence. Also convinced was LTG Daniel Graham, former DIA Director and member of the intelligence transition team. (Graham and Allen are two of my sources)

This is part of what LTG Tighe would later refer to as "a fast moving train of events" that lead to a rescue attempt. It is also part of Tighe's "personal opinion and stated assurance" that American POWs had been left behind, were captive then, when he boldly testified on June 25, 1981 and shocked a nation on national television.

So what happened? I confirmed that Special Operations personnel were alerted for a rescue plan. COL Nick Rowe, another of my sources, was picked to head the operation. He told Monika Jensen Stevenson that even the camp commander's name was known. On January 17, 1981, DIA requested that CIA undertake one more mission on the ground to verify American POWs at the facility. The United States government is still nervous over the failure of the Iran hostage rescue mission. NSC Advisor Allen insists that an American be part of the CIA mission. CIA "runs" the mission, but without American participation.

On March 18, 1981, Congressional leaders are informed of the POW information. ABC News, not knowing of this, airs a series of reports from Laos on probable POWs being held. Intelligence officials are "going up the wall - but keep silent." I arrive in Washington, D.C. and help people I know at ABC National News on the reports. I do not yet know of the rescue mission. By March 21, I put together my information and confirm it with Congressman Bob Dornan, head of the POW Task Force. I keep the information to myself. On March 29, 1981, a CIA reconnaisance team crosses the Mekong River and immediately is pinned down by Laotian army patrols. It took a month to move 40 miles. CIA botched the operation from the beginning. According to Time Magazine, CIA falsely said it spent two days at the detention facility when it really spent only two hours. Special Operations personnel, with extensive cross border experience, had wanted to do the reconnaissance, but CIA objected. CIA's "team" had no on the ground cross border experience, and did everything short of having a brass band announce they were coming. Someone leaked to the press about the mission and DOD did an admirable job of keeping the mission out of the press. ABC News, and other news organizations, also did an admirable job of keeping the news out of the public eye. However, activists were busy querying me about the mission and I told them to keep quiet and not spread what they thought they knew. By mid April, Jack Anderson had a column about POWs in a camp in Laos. By appropriate means, I informed DIA that leaks were abounding because I and people I work with feared more POWs on the rescue mission we knew was underway. We did not know, however, that rescue had been downgraded to reconnaissance and was being badly botched by CIA.

Prior, I said that Bo Gritz had been involved. I believe this for several reasons; A) Letters from MG Harold Aaron to Gritz gave him the "go ahead" to work on verifying POWs in Laos. Aaron suspected "it, but, at the same time hoped it wasn't so." In the first letter, Aaron said, "It is too bad we have to proceed this way, but the administration will not face up to the problem (talking of the Carter Administration). Gen Tighe is well aware of the situation, but his hands are tied... This thing is so sensitive it could result in a real inquisition if word leaked out that we were proceeding unofficially. This is a real hot potato so watch your back trail carefully... I am confident that once you prove beyond a doubt that our men are still captive the system will do the rest..." In this second letter, Aaron said, "... I was overwhelmed with what you had done... From the accounts you sent me, there can be no doubt about live Americans... I didn't realize the scope of it until I got all your material..." B) The closed door executive session made it plain that Bo Gritz was possibly related to the sensitive source. Congressional sources, present then, made it clear that Gritz was involved. Further, an affidavit filed in a federal court case, even redacted for security matters, fit perfectly with the classified material about the "sensitive source" which fits the Aaron letters. Others say it was a Thai source. I will not be dogmatic until all the sources are declassified. I do know that Gritz, at this time, contrary to the persistent whiner, was involved. In fact, in checking the whiner's web site, he incorrectly presumed that Gritz had learned of the rescue mission through Special Operations personnel being geared up for the rescue mission when in fact, as shown before, Gritz had been in Laos, with DIA "approval" over a year beforehand. But, then, because a person claims Military Intelligence experience, does not mean that he is privy to Special Operations facts. There are other problems with the whiner's "facts" on this operation as will be shortly shown.

Debunking POW Myths

Myth 1 - The whiner reported that in late 1980, a source reported to the CIA that US POWs might be held in an area of southern Laos. The source later claimed that US POWs were in a prison camp near the village of Nhommarath. CIA passed this report to DIA with the comment that the source's reliability was questionable. FACT - As told to Congress in a classified document listed in the book and as was declassified from a Top Secret report from DIA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, here are the facts: The source was labeled as "Sensitive" and "very high in reliability" to a Congressional Oversight Committee on June 25, 1981. On November 18, 1980, CIA reported this source as being a "highly reliable Thai source" to DIA. Time Magazine on October 17, 1994 reported the source as being called "W/1," "one of the most sensitive sources the CIA ever developed in Laos - an elderly woman with close ties to the communist leadership in the capital of Vientiane." Judge for yourself where the "myth is."

Myth 2 - Next it was reported - trying to discredit a family group, the National Alliance of Families, that just to be safe, DIA ordered satellite imagery and in early 1981, imagery of a known prison camp near Nomarrath was taken. One imagery analyst claimed that he observed: A) The letters "B-52" spelled out using either piled up logs or brush, or stamped out in the ground; B) Tools with handles too long better suited for Occidentals; and C) People seated cross-legged on the ground - more the style of Orientals vice Occidentals.

FACTS - Before going further, we'll break the above down. First, as reported to Congress, the first imagery was in October 1979 through 1980 and it "generally correlates with description of detention area" - not of the source in question - she had not even reported yet. This was in response to a series of reports - seen above - in particular from a resistance leader reporting not only American POWs but an Australian and a Japanese prisoner as well - and about 25 Lao prisoners - in not one but two locations near each other. Imagery from 4 and 10 December (reported to both Congress and the JCS) showed "a secure detention facility near Nhom Marrot. The facility was not constructed in Imagery of April 1978." The 10 December imagery shows it was "partially completed by September, 1979." Further, "imagery from 10 and 30 December, 1980, and 2 January 1981 reveals that the number '52' had been stamped in the dirt in the row crop area located between the camp inner and outer fencing, in a location not apparently observable from either of the two guard towers." The 30 December imagery indicates the presence of approximately 25 persons in the inner compound and imagery of 24 January 1981 indicates the presence of nine probable persons, four in the inner compound and five in the outer compound." Contrary to the subsequent many years later reinterpretation, a February 23, 1981 DIA memo said satellites photographed the camp for a month, and the 52 was always visible in the same place (Time Magazine op cit). Open to interpretation was the letter next to the 52 - either a "K" - standard signal for help - or a "B" which could be part of a SOG element - a bomber crew - or Baron 52 crew member. At was at this point that President Reagan, through his National Security Advisor, ordered the CIA to provide 24 hour surveillance - not "just to be safe" as reported by someone not even in the loop at the time. You be the judge of the myth involved.

We'll deal with only one more myth on this case - Myth 3 - because in life - 3 strikes and your credibility is out. There was no signal intelligence concerning Nomarrath.

FACTS - On June 25, 1981, in the Classified Congressional Briefing - Congressman Robert Dornan made mention that "prior to November 1980, but about the same time area, a broadcast was picked up referring to 27 American POWs moving from a cmp up north to this camp when it was prepared for occupancy..." The Confidential file note mentions that "every mention of 'radio broadcast' or 'intercept' was lined through and replaced with the word 'information' or 'intelligence... it may have been to allow storage at a lower level of classification..." I was told by no less than two other Congressional members about the intercepts. TIME (op. cit) found that a Thai Signal unit intercepted a radio messge from a top Laotian military leader ordering American POWs to be flown from Attopu to Central Laos. While CIA dismissed it, DIA, in coordination with NSA, found that a plane did leave as reported and besides highly reliable "W/1" confirmed the move. You decide on the myth.

I feel that there has been a concerted effort not to find POWs - too many things, like this 1981 rescue mission, have gone awry for it all to be accidental. Who? I don't know. CIA botched this one down to reportedly ordering white rope to be used in the jungle on the reconnaissance try. They disobeyed the command to have Americans in on the reconnaissance try. This particular rescue mission, covered in the book, had the best chance of success. Richard Allen believed Americans were there - he knew it was risky - and yet he and President Reagan said "GO." This was part of Tighe's "stated assurance" that POWs were left behind. There are other items to back this rescue plan up, but when the former head of DIA, LTG Daniel Graham and the then current head of DIA, LTG Eugene Tighe, both say that POWs were being held, then I pay attention. Further, a letter from President Ronald Reagan, which I saw, dated July 15, 1981, makes it clear that the operation was both authorized and compromised. Reagan said, "... our effort must be ... without publicity... we were not helped ... by the news story about our mission in Laos..." Who would know best what had been planned. I was assured by LTG Graham, NSC Advisor Richard Allen, and Congressman Robert Dornan, that a "rescue mission" was being planned and was on the "President's desk" back in March, 1981. Strike four (undeserved) for the self proclaimed myth breaker, is that it was more than a DIA Admiral involved - It was a coordinated - electronic - signal - photographic - human intelligence - border crossing - multi-agency decision that got botched at the last minute by CIA that never liked anyone else to play in their ball field. It was the last of a kind that was not repeated until the Senate POW Hearings gave the same type of analysis a shot. The result was the same - 11 years later, analysts believed POWs were still alive. However it happened, I feel it was compromised. The question becomes now what to do about the men left behind. For the 50% of the population (or up to 60%) who believe that they were, it becomes urgent now in 2000 because none of us, especially the POWs, are growing any younger and whoever was left alive in the last year of reporting, grows weaker in staying power each and every miserable day in prison.

FINAL MYTH - It is alleged that DPMO, the organization "looking" for POWs, went to Nhom Marroth and discovered only Laotians had been held there - They went in 1994! TIME (op cit) disovered that like every other mission to "discover facts," Laos knew they were coming in advance and waited for years to give permission to investigate. TIME reports the investigation was "rushed" - gave investigators "little time" to read the prisoner logs - and allowed interrogation of "only two elderly villagers." Naturally, they would not permit interrogation of anyone who knew the truth. Nor was it expected that would happen. Only MIAs are being looked for. Once again, you decide who the myth maker is. Remember, IT was Tighe, not I, who said he was frankly ashamed of the analysis job these guys were doing. IT was Tighe, not I, who said it was his "personal opinion and stated assurance" that men had been left behind, were captive then, and are captive still. (Look at the definitions of assurance versus proof for a lesson the other sites need to learn)